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1. Introduction
The emergence of index investing has led to a seemingly endless debate about the merits of
active portfolio management. According to the logic of Sharpe (1991)’s active management
arithmetic, active investing is doomed in aggregate, as French (2008) puts it. However, to
escape this seemingly irrefutable conclusion, Sharpe (1991) leaves a back door open by pointing
out three potential flaws in his theory. First, passive managers might not be genuinely passive.
Second, there might be substantial differences among active managers. Third, the summary
statistics of active managers might not truly represent the performance of the actively managed
dollar.1
In our analysis, we shed light on the potential pitfalls of Sharpe’s arithmetic using a rich
dataset of 61,269 equity and fixed income funds that held USD 17.8 trillion assets under
management by the end of 2016. The breadth of our data allows us to account for the
heterogeneity of active asset managers by differentiating between institutional and retail funds,
equity and fixed income funds, geographical regions, and investment categories. To explore
managerial skill, investor rationality, and competitiveness of the market for mutual funds, we
analyze the value-weighted performance before and after fees, benchmarking against investable
indexes under an appropriate statistical framework.
Many research papers, investors, and advisors place themselves in either the active or
passive camp. The staunch defenders of active investing argue along the lines of Berk and
Green (2004), who show that rational markets do not contradict the existence of skilled fund
managers who consistently beat the market. They build their argument on a fundamental
1Some recent literature started to challenge Sharpe’s arithmetic. For instance, Berk and van Binsbergen
(2015) correctly highlight that, even in Sharpe’s arithmetic, active mutual funds can outperform the market
because they only represent a subset of active investors. Pedersen (2018) points to Sharpe’s implicit assumption
that the market portfolio never changes, which does not hold in the real world, forcing passive investors to trade
regularly. Recently, van Binsbergen and Opp (2019) criticizes that Sharpe’s arithmetic remains absolutely
silent about the price discovery mechanism of active management. Moreover, Sharpe’s arithmetic also fails
because even passive investors have to trade at least twice: once to get in and once to get out. Such trading
patterns may be exploited by active investors. We thank Jules van Binsbergen for pointing this out.
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principle of economics: agents earn economic rents if, and only if, they have a competitive
advantage. Hence, active investing is a zero-sum game after fees. Recently, Berk and van
Binsbergen (2015) have provided empirical support for the claim that mutual fund managers
do have skills.
In contrast, the proponents of passive investing argue along the lines of Fama and French
(2010) in that the high fees of active management turn it into a negative-sum game after
costs. A negative net performance provides us with some indication of investor rationality. A
statistically negative net performance implies that investors systematically commit too much
money to a fund. Indeed, French (2008) and Fama and French (2010), among many others,
provide ample evidence that actively managed US equity mutual funds underperform their
multi-factor benchmark after fees. In their view, active investing is at most a zero-sum game
before fees, but not after fees. Consequently, over recent years, we have witnessed a massive
inflow of funds into index investing.
These observations naturally drive us to question the value of active management. Our
main focus in answering this question will be on the performance comparison of active and
index funds. In this sense, we leave aside the price discovery aspect of active management.
Recently, van Binsbergen and Opp (2019) provide a framework that allows capturing the real
economic value that active managers provide by reducing alphas in the market. Hence, index
funds profit profit from the work of active managers, as they increase market efficiency and the
value of the market portfolio. This price discovery mechanism provides yet another argument
against Sharpe’s arithmetic. Since we do not consider this potential free-rider problem by
passive investors, our analysis can be regarded as a conservative estimate of the rationality
and competitiveness of the mutual fund industry.
Before we can start with our performance analysis, we need to decide on how to measure
performance and how to define an appropriate benchmark. As Berk and van Binsbergen
(2017) convincingly argue, there is no unique way to measure performance: it depends on
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the research question. If we want to assess the rationality of fund investors and the degree
of competition in different markets, then the appropriate measure is the fund’s net alpha. If,
however, we want to measure the skill of an active manager, then we need to calculate the
value added, i.e., the fund’s assets under management times the gross alpha.
Typically, researchers use a well established multi-factor model to proxy for the alternative
opportunity set available to investors. However, multi-factor models include long–short port-
folios with often very high turnover, generating considerable transaction costs.2 Furthermore,
also as argued by Berk and van Binsbergen (2017), we might have a situation in which we
measure the performance of a fund at a time when the fund manager would not have known
about some factors, as they were identified only much later.
Nevertheless, Fama and French (2010) argue that benchmarking against multi-factor mod-
els leads to the same conclusions as benchmarking against index funds, because the value-
weighted portfolio of index funds exhibits close to zero alphas. Although we agree with their
arguments for the US equity market, many index funds can also exhibit negative alphas rela-
tive to a multi-factor benchmark, depending on the asset class and the market.3 Also, there
is no general agreement on the factors that should be included in a benchmark, leading to
a severe selection bias. Hence, for performance analysis, we favor suitably defined investable
benchmarks, while we use multi-factor models to understand the potentially different risk and
style exposures of active and index funds.
The choice of the benchmark is just as critical as the measurement of the active perfor-
mance. As highlighted in Berk and van Binsbergen (2015) and Pedersen (2018), also passive
managers have to trade, when they either enter or leave the market, or when changes in the
2For a recent approach to estimate mutual fund skill based on multi-factor benchmarks and Bayesian
techniques, see Andrikogiannopoulou and Papakonstantinou (2016).
3In an earlier version of the paper, we also analyzed single funds and benchmarked them against different
multi-factor models and an investable benchmark. We found that retail funds perform worse than institutional
funds and that, surprisingly, also index funds may deliver negative alpha and perform even worse than active
funds if benchmarked against multi-factor models. However, an index fund may also exhibit skill, in line with
the results previously found in Crane and Crotty (2018).
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replicating index occur.4 Hence, the first back door of Sharpe’s arithmetic becomes more im-
portant, since passive managers act not truly passive. Thus, to build the benchmark for active
managers within an investment category, we value-weight all index investors within the same
Morningstar investment category and thereby obtain the average opinion of all passive investor
about the replicating index and the implementation methodology.5 Then, to analyze the ra-
tionality and competitiveness of the mutual fund industry, we focus on the value-weighted
alpha of active funds within the Morningstar investment categories benchmarked against the
value-weighted index funds within the same investment category.
In a preliminary analysis of our fund data, we find significant evidence for serial and cross-
sectional dependence in our mutual fund data. Therefore, we use a statistical framework with
two key elements. First, we develop a robust statistical test for the mutual funds’ alpha,
which takes into account serial dependence. Second, we use these test statistics as input for
the multiple hypothesis testing methods of Romano and Wolf (2016), which is robust to the
presence of cross-sectional dependence.6 In a simulation study, we find that the standard
inference techniques are liberal in rejecting the null hypothesis, while we obtain accurate
empirical rejection probabilities for our block resampling based alpha test. Other papers
that conduct bootstrapped inference, such as Kosowski et al. (2006) and Fama and French
(2010), sample one-period returns and, therefore, lose any information on the potential serial
dependence; nor do they adjust for multiple hypotheses.7
Using our robust alpha test as input for the method of Romano and Wolf (2016) to adjust
for multiple hyptheses, we find that there are significant negative alphas after cost for the
4For instance, when MSCI Inc. decided to consider China A Shares in 2018 partially, all index investors
that replicated their emerging market index started to buy the new inclusions.
5If we would take the best index fund or concentrate on a specific provider, we would include a selection
bias in our comparison. Using a value-weighted approach, we obtain a representative benchmark for a given
investment category.
6By doing so, we avoid the pitfalls of the multiple hypothesis approach of Barras, Scalliet, and Wermers
(2010) based on the false discovery rate (FDR), which may produce significantly biased results in the presence
of cross-sectional dependence as recently shown by Andrikogiannopoulou and Papakonstantinou (2018).
7The Matlab code of the robust statistical framework for the alpha is available from the authors on request.
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institutional “US Equity Large Cap Blend” and retail “Canada Fixed Income” categories. This
finding corroborates the conclusion of Fama and French (2010) for these specific investment
categories. However, for all of the other categories, our results support Berk and Green (2004)
and Berk and van Binsbergen (2015) in that we cannot reject the hypothesis that it is a zero-
sum game after costs.8 Furthermore, before costs, none of the active fund categories generate
significantly negative alphas. Some of them even show significantly positive alphas before
costs.
Analyzing the drivers of the difference in the performance of active and index funds, we find
that the equity and fixed income active managers have less exposure to traditional risk factors
such as market and duration risk. Instead, active equity funds have a small cap and growth
stock bias and active fixed income funds load on credit risk. Surprisingly, when the market
is affected by unexpected volatility shocks, active management tends to underperform the
average index investor. In periods of calm markets and when the implied volatility decreases,
active managers tend to outperform. We explain this finding as being due to active managers
who prefer to sell insurance and generate exposures to risk premia that perform well in good
times but may cause substantial losses in bad times. The significant higher exposure to small
cap companies for equity and credit risk for fixed income managers supports this hypothesis.9
Our data also allows us to shed light on the difference between retail and institutional funds
and the role of fees. While before fees, retail and institutional active funds deliver a similar
and positive alpha, the differences become large when we take fees into account. Particularly
for fixed income funds, the aggregated alpha moves into negative territory. Moreover, we
8These findings resonate well with Pastor, Stambaugh, and Taylor (2015), who argue that in markets in
which the mutual fund industry is big, such as the “US Equity Large Cap Blend,” active alphas tend to be
negative, and the equal-weighted alpha within investment categories exceeds the value-weighted alpha.
9Agarwal and Naik (2004) find similar return patterns for hedge funds. Thus, mutual funds try to profit
from the same opportunities as hedge funds but have of course a narrower set of investment opportunities,
due to regulatory restrictions. However, our results seem to contradict some of the previous findings, such
as those of Moskowitz (2000) and Kosowski (2011), among others. They find that actively managed mutual
funds tend to perform better than their passive benchmarks in bad times. However, these papers do not cover
the recent financial crisis.
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find that small retail funds with high fees have a significantly negative alpha. Hence, we
suspect that this observation is a primary driver of Fama and French (2010)’s conclusion,
since these funds obtain a substantial weight in their performance analysis. Our results also
provide direct evidence for Garleanu and Pedersen (2018), who argue that more sophisticated
investors outperform small investors because of the higher economies of scale in searching for
skilled active managers.10 Moreover, our results endorse the hypothesis of Gennaioli, Shleifer,
and Vishny (2015), who claim that trust is an essential component of the high fees in asset
management, and who argue that active retail managers profit from pandering to trusting
investors by buying hot assets, which explains the tendency for active retail mutual funds to
have positive exposure to growth stocks.
We further demonstrate, along the lines of Carhart (1997), that the average active retail
investor can significantly improve their performance over the period ranging from 1993 to 2016,
provided the worst-performing active mutual funds of the past year are neglected. However,
when the investor concentrates only on the top performing funds, the overall performance
cannot be significantly improved. Also, we explore the role of fund size and fees on fund
performance. Sorting active fund portfolios according to their performance persistence, fees,
and size, we find that winner portfolios with low-fee and small funds tend to outperform, but
their alpha does not survive our test statistics. However, for both equity and fixed income
retail funds, we find that a fund investor is well advised to avoid high-fee and small losers, as
they generate significantly negative alphas.
We organize the remainder of this paper as follows. Section 2 discusses the data and
performs a preliminary analysis, which motivates the design of our empirical tests. Section 3
presents our robust alpha test and the multiple hypothesis framework. In Section 4, we provide
a comparison of the value-weighted performance of active and index mutual funds portfolios
10Also, our empirical analysis supports the findings of Gerakos, Linnainmaa, and Morse (2016), who show
that institutional investors outperform their strategy benchmarks after fees. Their analysis is based on self-
reported but GIPS (Global Investment Performance Standard) compliant data, which still may inherit some
biases, while we build our analysis on publicly available performance data.
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across investment categories and asset classes. We analyze the drivers of the performance
difference of active and index funds, and we explore the role of performance persistence, fund
size, and fees. Section 5 concludes.
2. Preliminary Analysis
We first describe our data. Then, we analyze the potential time and cross-sectional depen-
dencies in mutual fund returns to guide the formulation of appropriate test statistics for our
hypotheses.
2.1 Data
Our mutual fund sample is drawn from the Morningstar database and ranges from December
1991 to December 2016. We include a total of 61,269 funds from different asset classes.11
Table 1 shows the summary statistics of cross-sectional monthly attributes across asset classes.
In our data, we have 14,969 institutional and 46,300 retail funds, while we have 56,136 active
and 5,133 index funds. In general, there are fewer index funds, but they show higher average
total net assets (TNA) and net returns, and also lower fees and about the same average
years in the database. As expected, the institutional funds charge lower fees than their retail
counterparts.
[Table 1 about here.]
As of December 2016, the total net assets of equity retail funds amounted to USD 9 trillion,
those of fixed income retail funds to USD 3.7 trillion, and those of equity institutional funds
11In comparison, Pastor, Stambaugh, and Taylor (2015) explore 3,126 actively managed US equity-only
mutual funds while Berk and van Binsbergen (2015) use 5,974 actively managed funds. Ferreira et al. (2013)
analyze the performance of 16,316 open-end actively managed equity funds in 27 countries from 1997 to 2007.
Banegas et al. (2013) focus on 4,200 European equity mutual funds. Hence, we add to the existing literature
by providing evidence based on our new dataset. Furthermore, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first
to apply a robust multiple hypothesis framework to active and index mutual funds in an international context
and using investable benchmarks.
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and fixed income institutional fund to USD 3.1 trillion and USD 2 trillion, respectively. Since
institutional investors often invest their money through mandates, there are fewer institutional
funds than retail funds. The assets under management for index funds have been steadily
increasing over our sample period. By the end of 2016, we find the highest concentration of
index funds for equity funds, with 28% for retail and 32% for institutional funds. Looking
at the fixed income funds, we find 18% of the retail and 13% of the institutional funds were
index funds. For a more detailed description of the data and the data cleaning procedures,
we refer to Appendix A.
For the performance analysis of fund portfolios, we construct investable benchmarks based
on Morningstar’s investment categories.12 We rely on these categories as they are well estab-
lished in the industry, and their definition perfectly serves our intention to benchmark active
funds. We acknowledge that there are many routes to take for benchmarking fund portfolios.
In practice, when investors or active managers focus on a specific investment category, they
do not compare themselves with the multi-factor models in general, rather, they compare
themselves with other funds within the same category. As Morningstar states on its website,
“the classifications were introduced in 1996 to help investors make meaningful comparisons
between mutual funds.” While the investment objective stated in a fund’s prospectus does
not always reflect how the fund actually invests, Morningstar places funds in a given category
based on their portfolio statistics and securities holdings.
To construct an investable benchmark, we value-weight all index funds within a given
investment category. By value-weighting the index funds in each category, we obtain our
investable benchmarks which we use for calculating the alphas of active funds portfolios. In
contrast to existing literature that focused on the Vanguard’s index funds only we include all
12See Table A.1 in the Appendix for a list and summary statistics of the regarded investment categories.
For the investable one-factor model, we require at least 12 monthly returns and for the multi-factor models at
least 36 monthly returns.
9
index providers that operate within a specific investment category.13 We thereby reduce the
selection bias that arises when we concentrate on one index provider only. Since we value-
weight also the index funds, market leaders such as Vanguard still obtain a high weight in the
analysis.
Since we require connected time-series for our multiple hypothesis adjustment, we focus on
the periods from 1993 to 2016 and 2000 to 2016, which allows us to include more investment
categories for the more recent time periods. Given that index mutual funds only emerged
recently, we observe for the period starting in 1993 at least one index fund for four institutional
and 17 retail categories. For the more recent period starting in 2000, we obtain 30 investment
categories for the retail segment and 12 investment categories for the institutional segment.
Hence, we end up with 63 categories.
2.2 Dependency Analysis
It is well known that statistical inference for econometric models is severely complicated by
the existence of serial and cross-sectional dependencies. Fama and French (2010) find that
cross-sectional dependence can materially change the inference and, therefore, propose an
appropriate adjustment for their single fund analysis. At the same time, they correctly point
to a potential caveat in their resampling approach. Because they perform a random sampling
of months, they lose any effects of autocorrelation. Similarly, neither does Barras, Scalliet, and
Wermers (2010) take into account serial dependence for their single-fund analysis, claiming
that they find such an effect only for a few mutual funds. Moreover, they argue that the cross-
sectional dependencies in their sample are sufficiently low to allow consistent estimators. Given
that we do not analyze the returns of single funds as in Barras, Scalliet, and Wermers (2010)
and Fama and French (2010) but of mutual fund portfolios, we must take a closer look at our
data.
13As an example, Fama and French (2010) consider Vanguard’s index funds holding US stocks only. Berk
and van Binsbergen (2015) include Vanguard’s index funds that hold not only US but also international stocks.
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We first test for serial dependence, applying both the classical Ljung–Box (LJ) test and,
as a robustness check, the distribution-free test of Genest and Rémillard (2004).14 For both
tests we must fix the number of lags L, for which we use the automatic block-length selection
for the dependent bootstrap of Politis and White (2004) and the correction of Patton, Politis,
and White (2009). We find that most mutual funds show an optimal block size of two or
three. Therefore, we set the lag L to three for the two tests. Testing for serial dependence,
we find that on a 5% level the rejection rates range between 19% for retail funds and 44%
for institutional funds. Furthermore, when we go into more detail, we find that the single
mutual funds with the longest available time-series show a higher percentage of rejections. For
example, the 2% oldest equity and fixed income single mutual funds, benchmarked against
the investable model, exhibit statistically significant serial dependence in 40% and 63% of the
cases. This evidence clearly justifies the need to control for dependence over time when we
analyze the alpha of portfolios of mutual funds.
We next test for cross-sectional dependence, which might occur if mutual funds “herd” in
their holdings, as is shown by Wermers (1999). To detect cross-sectional dependence in our
data, we apply the test of Pesaran (2004). To compute the test statistic, we concentrate on
funds that have more than one time period in common. Our empirical tests indicate that we
can reject the null hypothesis of no cross-sectional dependence at the one percent significance
level for all portfolio fund categories. While we find an average pairwise correlation of 14%
(11%) for institutional (retail) funds, they vary across the different investment categories from
−0.39% to as much as 66%. Since already low levels of cross-sectional and serial dependencies
may distort statistical inference, the above empirical evidence dictates that statistical tests
must take into account both serial and cross-sectional dependence.
14Much criticism has been leveled at the possible low power of the LJ test. The LJ test is based on
autocorrelations and, hence, it is not a real test of independence. The test developed by Genest and Rémillard
(2004) uses ranks and, therefore, is distribution-free and does not depend on the underlying distribution of
the observations.
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3. Robust Alpha Test and Multiple Hypotheses
To control for serial dependence, we propose a robust alpha test based on a studentized block
bootstrap, which improves the accuracy of an inference for dependent time-series data com-
pared to other methods. To compute the bootstrapped t-statistics and p-values we closely
follow Ledoit and Wolf (2008, 2011), who study the related problem of testing whether two
Sharpe ratios or two variances are equal. We outline the mathematical details of the boot-
strapped standard error of the estimated alpha in Appendix B. Once we have calculated the
bootstrapped t-statistics and p-values in Equations (B.12) and (B.13), we can use them as
input for multiple hypothesis testing.
While we control for serial dependence for the single-hypothesis alpha test, we control
for cross-sectional dependence for the multiple-hypothesis method in which we control the
family-wise error rate (FWER).15 When we control for the FWER, we apply the state of the
art multiple hypothesis framework of Romano and Wolf (2016), which provides an efficient
way to calculate the adjusted p-values. Since for the fund portfolios we have no missing values
or disconnected time-series, as is the case for single funds, we can jointly sample blocks of fund
and benchmark returns, thereby taking fully into account cross-sectional dependence. Since
we sample the test statistics with our robust alpha test, we fully take into account the serial
dependence structure as well.
To explore the accuracy of our test, we present the results of a simulation exercise in
Appendix C. We find that our robust alpha test is still liberal but more accurate since it
also corrects for the serial dependence observed in the data. The standard inference tests
are too liberal in rejecting the null hypothesis. Thus, when we apply the standard tests or
sample only one return each time instead of a block of returns, we generate more type I errors
15The FWER dates back to Bonferroni (1936), and is defined as the probability of at least one false discovery.
Romano and Wolf (2005a,b) introduce a stepwise multiple testing procedure that not only has higher statistical
power than the tests of Bonferroni (1936) and Holm (1979) but also allows for cross-sectional dependence.
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(false positive findings) than expected by the test. We also note that even if there is no serial
dependence, our block-bootstrapped alpha test statistic is accurate.
4. Value-weighted Portfolios of Mutual Funds
As Berk and Green (2004) argue, funds managed by skilled managers attract greater portfolio
flows than funds managed by unskilled managers. Hence, if we want to measure the skill of
a fund manager, or if we want to test whether active investing is a zero-sum game, we must
measure performance on a value-weighted basis and against an investable benchmark.
4.1 Alpha Relative to Investable Benchmarks
To compare the performance of active and index investing, we use investable benchmark
models based on Morningstar’s investment categories, as described in Section 2.1. In Figure 1,
we plot the robust p-values against the net and gross alphas for each of the available investment
categories. As argued in Section 3, we adjust the p-values for multiple hypothesis testing using
the method of Romano and Wolf (2016).
[Figure 1 about here.]
After fees, we find the “US Equity Large Cap Blend” category for institutional funds and the
“Canada Fixed Income” category for retail funds to significantly underperform the alternative
of the value-weighted index funds for both periods. For the negative alpha of the “Euro Fixed
Income” retail category and the period from 1992 to 2016 we also find a significant p-value.
Hence, only for three investment categories can we reject the zero-sum game hypothesis of Berk
and Green (2004). Furthermore, our finding that “US Equity Large Cap Blend” institutional
funds underperform after fees is perfectly in line with the argument of Pastor, Stambaugh,
and Taylor (2015), in that higher competition in big active mutual fund industries leads to
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diminishing returns to scale. Before fees, there are no investment categories with significantly
negative alphas. However, we find “US Fixed Income” from 1992 to 2016, and “Global Equity
Large Cap,” “Emerging Markets Equity,” and “Europe Equity Large Cap” from 2000 to 2016
for institutional, and also “Global Equity Large Cap” from 1992 to 2016 and “Global Equity”
from 2000 to 2016 for retail funds to significantly outperform the value-weighted index funds.16
In addition to the hypothesis whether alpha is zero after fees, we can also ask how the value
added by active management behaves over time and whether there are substantial differences
across markets. In Figure 2, we aggregate the total value in US dollars that was extracted
from the market by active management and compare it to the total fee value in US dollars
that was paid by investors.17
[Figure 2 about here.]
For retail funds, Figure 2 tells us that active US funds fail to extract value from the
market. For both equity and fixed-income funds, the value added is mostly close to zero.
US equity funds experienced a severe drop during the second half of the 1990ies, recuperated
in 2000 and the following years, but started to decline again after the recent financial crisis
gradually. In contrast, US fixed income funds suffered a sudden drop during the financial crisis
but profited considerably during the recovery from an increasing risk appetite and decreasing
credit spreads.18
For active US equity funds, we find that the total extracted value before costs decreases
since the financial crisis for both retail and institutional investors. While for institutional
16We remark that the choice of a block size of three is a conservative choice. As a robustness check, when we
apply a block size of six or nine, the p-values increase slightly. The “Euro Fixed Income,” “Emerging Markets
Equity,” and “Europe Equity Large Cap” categories, which all exhibit a p-value just below 10% for the block
size of three, start to show insignificant p-values, further supporting the theory that alpha is zero after fees.
17In particular, we first compute the value-weighted gross alpha within an investment category against the
value-weighted gross benchmark of the index funds and then aggregate the investment categories with the
assets under management of all active funds within each category. We split into retail and institutional funds
in the US and non-US investment categories.
18As we see in Table 2, active managers in the US show a significant exposure to the credit spread for both
retail and institutional funds.
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funds, the value extracted from the market becomes less than the value of the fees only
recently in 2014, for retail funds the value added is only above the fees at the very beginning
of our sample period. This observation, particularly for retail funds, resonates well with the
negative value-weighted net alphas from our previous analysis and the poor performance of
active management highlighted by Fama and French (2010) for the US equity market.
However, for non-US funds, Figure 2 conveys a different message. Over the whole sample
period, institutional non-US equity funds extract a value from the market that is substantially
above their fees. Even for retail funds the value added is above their fees, at least during most
of the sample period. In the fixed income space, while US institutional active managers extract
more value compared to the total fees paid, non-US funds struggled recently. For both retail
and institutional fixed income active managers, the total gross alpha decreased significantly
for non-US investors around 2014. In a detailed analysis, we find that this decrease coincides
with the beginning of quantitative easing in Europe and its impact on the European fixed
income market. Active managers were underweighted in bonds of the periphery European
countries that profited the most.19
We interpret our finding that non-US active equity funds add more value than US managers
as supporting evidence to the theory of Pastor, Stambaugh, and Taylor (2015) in the sense
that the higher competition in mature and large mutual fund industries decreases the fund’s
ability to outperform passive benchmarks. Interestingly, the US fixed income market behaves
differently, which may indicate that the competition in this segment remains low, regardless
of fund size, potentially due to the higher complexity of the product.
Because the added values and fees in Figure 2 depend on the total amount that was
invested in each segment, we also analyze the evolution of the value-weighted alphas along
the same dimensions as in Figure 2. In Figure 3, we show the cumulated aggregated alpha
19As we show later in Table 2, active fixed income managers tend to have a negative duration exposure.
Hence, the decreasing yields in European markets hurt their performance.
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of active index funds over time.20 Equal weighted, all investment categories for equity funds
provide a positive alpha over time, even after fees. Value weighted, the aggregated alphas
remain positive before fees, but they are zero for institutional funds and slightly negative for
retail funds after fees. For the fixed income mutual funds, we find that the value-weighted
alpha across investment regions is positive for the equal and value-weighted aggregation of
the investment categories. For the institutional funds after fees, we also observe positive
alphas over time. There are three major periods where active managers underperformed their
index counterpart: equity funds before the burst of the dot-com bubble, both equity and
fixed income funds in the financial crisis, and a slight underperformance in the recent past,
especially after fees.
[Figure 3 about here.]
Garleanu and Pedersen (2018) argue that small investors tend to underperform because
of their higher search costs and fees, while large investors are expected to outperform after a
certain size because of their economies of scale and lower fees. For equity funds, the patterns
observed in Figure 3 confirm their theory. We observe higher aggregated alphas for institu-
tional funds after costs, but similar alphas for retail equity managers before costs. Since retail
funds can pool the investments of small investors, and mutual funds often manage retail and
institutional money in the same aggregated fund, we expect this pattern. For fixed income
funds, we make a similar observation.
What is surprising in Figure 3, however, is the existence of three major periods where
active managers underperformed their index counterparts: before the burst of the dot-com
bubble, in the financial crisis, and in the recent past. Since we would have expected that
20We first compute the value-weighted alpha within an investment category against the value-weighted
benchmark of the index funds and then aggregate the investment categories with equal and value-weights. We
also split into retail and institutional funds before and after fees.
For the equity mutual funds, we find that active mutual funds provide a superior alpha than index funds in
every analysis before fees.
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active management pays in turbulent times, we will further explore this observation in the
next section.
4.2 Drivers for the Difference in Performance of Active and Index funds
To gain further intuition about what drives a wedge between the performance of the average
active fund and that of the average index fund, we ask whether the multi-factor model provides
some explanation for the difference in returns between the value-weighted portfolios of active
and index mutual funds. Alerted by our observation from Figure 2, we enrich our regressions
with the volatility index (VIX) of the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) as a fear
gauge to proxy for market uncertainty.21
Table 2 shows the results for both active equity and fixed income funds when measured
against the investable benchmark. Overall, the average values of R2 absorb a significant
fraction of the variance of the alpha before fees, in particular for fixed income funds and
US institutional equity funds. For the equity funds in Panel A, we observe that the gross
alpha loads profoundly and significantly on the SMB factor. Also, especially in the US, the
performance difference loads negatively on the HML factor. The exposure is more pronounced
for retail funds. Institutional funds, in contrast, have a much lower exposure to growth stocks.
Overall, active funds seem to have a prominent small-cap bias and favor growth over value
stocks. Furthermore, they tend to load positively on the momentum factor and negatively on
the betting-against-beta factor.
Furthermore, we observe that the US equity market is the only market that shows a nega-
tive exposure to value (HML) for both retail and institutional investors. This finding implies
that active managers favor glamour stocks as highlighted by Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny
21We downloaded the time-series of the VIX index of the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) from
Bloomberg. In unreported results, we find that a high level of proxied uncertainty, e.g., by earnings-per-share
volatility or dispersion of returns within a fund category, is in general favorable for the performance of actively
managed funds. However, these effects are not significant.
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(2015) to attract investors to invest in their funds in this highly competitive mutual fund in-
dustry. The benefit from pandering might be more important compared to the higher return
of contrarian strategies and might also be an explanation for the lower overall performance of
active managers in the highly competitive US market.
[Table 2 about here.]
Concerning the VIX, we find that the difference in performance of active and index invest-
ing shows a negative sensitivity to changes in the VIX, which is often statistically significant.
At first sight, this finding seems to run against our intuition, as we would expect active man-
agers to use their skill to anticipate sudden uncertainty shocks. However, active managers
that protect their portfolio against adverse shocks must pay an insurance premium in the
long term. Such protection would generate relative losses to the market return in good times.
Therefore, our result suggests that active managers prefer to run a short exposure to general
market volatility, i.e., they tend to prefer small gains by selling insurance.
In Table 2, Panel B, we see that fixed income managers have a negative exposure to the
shift factor. Consequently, they are less affected by rising interest rates. In exchange, they
load on other risk factors to compensate for the lower expected returns. In particular, they
load significantly on the credit risk factor. As in Panel A for equity funds, fixed income
managers also have a negative exposure to changes in the VIX. Therefore, they lose money if
the VIX increases sharply, as it did during the latest financial crises, which also explains the
large drop in the cumulative alpha in Figure 2 towards the end of 2008.
4.3 Persistence Analysis
From an investor’s perspective, it may be disappointing that active fund investing provides, by
and large, zero alpha after fees. How then can a fund investor do better and profit from actively
managed funds? An initial idea is provided by Carhart (1997). He finds that US equity mutual
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funds with a substantial underperformance over the past year persist to underperform over the
next year relative to a multi-factor benchmark. In contrast to the outperformance of the best
mutual funds, he cannot explain the persistence in the worst mutual funds. Thus, it would
be of interest to know whether this observation carries over to our setting with investable
benchmarks.
To simulate the returns to an average active investor who trades according to this simple
rule, we build momentum portfolios of active funds as follows. Every year in December,
we first sort the active funds within each investment category based on their t-value for the
value-weighted alpha measured against the investable benchmark.22 Then, we invest in the
value-weighted portfolio of the x% best performing active funds and normalize the weights
each month. We repeat the same exercise for the x% worst performing funds. If one month
there is no data for a particular fund, it disappears from the portfolio. To aggregate the
performance numbers of the different investment categories, we value-weight the net returns
by the total active assets.23 We assume that funds do not charge transaction costs for incoming
and outcoming investors.
[Table 3 about here.]
Table 3 presents the momentum portfolio returns when selecting the best performing (Panel
A) and the worst performing funds (Panel B). In Panel A, we find that the performance
increases the more we focus on the best performing funds. For equity funds, the alpha after
fees climbs from −0.23% (−0.60%) to a remarkable 0.62% (−0.02%) for institutional (retail)
funds. For retail fixed income funds, alpha increases from −0.75% to −0.40%, but decreases for
22To compute the alpha, we require at least ten of the twelve most recent monthly returns. When we sort
by the t-value for the alpha, we consider the market risk of the fund and look at both the relative performance
and the consistency of the relative performance against the benchmark.
23For x% we chose steps of 10% starting with all mutual funds to the best 10% mutual funds. We disregard
data points where we have less than ten active mutual funds, and to calculate the benchmark return for
the alpha we must have at least one index fund within the category for the past twelve months to start the
out-of-sample backtest. For some small investment categories, over the year the number of funds drops below
ten. In this case, we apply the next less restrictive filter.
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institutional fixed income funds from 0.26 to 0.16.24 However, all these results are statistically
insignificant, as the robust p-values remain high or even increase. Hence, after fees, even
the best performing funds provide an alpha for the fund investor, which is statistically not
different from zero. This absence of persistence supports the theoretical argument of Berk and
Green (2004) that persistence should not exist since new money flows into well-performing
funds and there are diseconomies of scale, or because successful funds capture excess returns
by raising fees.25
In Panel B of Table 3, we form portfolios by selecting the x% worst performing funds. We
find that the value-weighted performance decreases drastically. For instance, for institutional
equity funds it drops from -0.23% to -0.94%. However, only for retail funds does the negative
performance of the 10% worst performing funds survive our robust alpha test adjusted for
multiple hypothesis testing. For equity retail funds, the performance drops to -1.39% at
the 5% significance level and, for fixed income retail funds, it drops to -0.84% at the 10%
significance level. Hence, while Carhart (1997) shows for US equity funds and under a multi-
factor benchmark that the persistence is significant for the worst performing funds, we can
confirm this result only for retail equity and fixed income funds. Obviously, from these funds,
the investor receives a negative alpha after costs. For institutional funds, we do not find such
evidence. At the same time, Table 3 confirms Carhart (1997) in that we do not find any
unexplainable persistence in overperforming funds.
Chen et al. (2004) and Yan (2008) find a negative relation between alpha and size and a
positive relation with past return. Thus, on average, they find that future alpha is smaller for
large funds but past returns are associated with higher future alpha, and predictability exists.
Recently, Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2012) show that alpha persistence does not disappear for
24Interestingly, for fixed income institutional funds, we observe substantially lower betas the more we exclude
badly performing funds from the portfolio, indicating that the best performing fixed income funds run a slightly
different exposure than their investable benchmark suggests.
25As an additional exercise, we also explored the persistence of gross alphas. In unreported results, we find
that the alphas increase substantially, but still they do not survive our statistical test, not even for the 10%
best performing funds.
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larger funds. To explore the interplay between size and predictability, we perform a bivariate
sort on size and persistence.
[Table 4 about here.]
Table 8 presents the alphas after fees for the different portfolios sorted according to fund
size and the previous year’s performance. We find that, except for fixed income retail funds,
small winner funds perform better than their larger counterparts. They produce the highest
alphas relative to their investable benchmarks. However, this outperformance is statistically
insignificant. At the same time, we identify the small loser funds as the funds with the worst
performance. For retail equity and fixed income funds, the negative alphas of small (and
medium) loser funds become even statistically significant. Unsuccessful and small funds will
continue to be unsuccessful, and they do so in a statistically significant way, while large funds
tend to underperform but not significantly so. These findings resonate well with Berk and
Green (2004)’s hypothesis that fund performance is inversely related to size due to disec-
onomies of scale.
4.4 Is the US Active Fund Industry Oversized?
As we observe in Figure 1, “Europe Equity Large Cap Inst.” provides a significantly positive
value-weighted gross alpha, while “US Equity Large Cap Blend Inst.” generates a significantly
negative net alpha. This observation, together with the existence of diseconomies of scales,
leads us to suspect that the disappointing performance of US equity funds relative to other
equity funds is due to a potentially overfunded US industry. To shed light on this issue, we
apply the methodology of Zhu (2018) to US and European equity funds. In particular, we
assume that in a simplified setting the gross alpha αg depends on fund size q as
αg = a− b log(q). (1)
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If the manager optimizes the value added, defined as V = αgq, the optimal actively managed
amount is just q∗ = exp(a/b − 1). Moreover, the critical fund size at which the value added
becomes zero is qc = exp(a/b).
We can classify a fund i if qi < q
∗
i as underfunded, as moderately overfunded if qi ∈ (q∗i qci )],
and as excessively overfunded if qi > q
c
i . To calculate the optimal and critical funds sizes, we
estimate the bi’s and ai’s as in Zhu (2018), i.e., to minimize the effect of estimation errors, we
first estimate b by forming decile portfolios, and then we estimate the individual ai’s. Also,
we use the mean size over a fund’s lifetime as a proxy for qi. Equipped with these estimates,
we can then calculate the fractions of over- and underfunded funds.
[Figure 4 about here.]
Figure 4 confirms our suspicion for the US market. Over the whole sample period, we
find a fraction of 52% of excessively overfunded US equity funds, which aligns well with the
54% found in Zhu (2018).26 Furthermore, 20% are moderately overfunded, and only 28% of
the funds are underfunded. We further observe a trend in these fractions. The number of
excessively overfunded funds increases from 33% in 1992 to 59% by the end of 2016, while
the underfunded fraction decreases from 54% to 22%. When analyzing the fraction of AuM
managed by excessively overfunded managers, we find that this number increased from 29%
to 58%; hence, this share has doubled over the sample period.
In Figure 4, we also present the corresponding plots for the European funds. In contrast
to the US, we identify over the whole sample only 32% as excessively overfunded and 53%
as underfunded. As for the US, we find an increase in the number of overfunded funds over
time, but this increase is less pronounced than in the US and at a lower level. The fraction
of underfunded funds decreases from 66% in 1992 to 56% by the end of 2016. The excessively
overfunded mutual funds gain in importance with a share of 19% at the beginning and 29% by
26Our US fund data consist of 6,601 funds with a minimum size of 5 million December 2016 US dollars in
assets under management (AuM), which have at least a history of three years of monthly data. Zhu (2018)
analysis includes only 3,077 funds.
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the end of our sample period. While the fraction of AuM managed by excessively overfunded
funds has doubled in the US, for European funds this number has plunged from 66% to 21%
over the same period.
Figure 4 also shows the immense growth of the mutual fund industry, both in the US as
well as in Europe. However, the growth in the US has been much stronger. The average
monthly AuM increased from 1992 to 2016 by a factor of 90, whereas the AuM in Europe
increased by a factor of 31. At the same time, the AuM per fund increased by a factor of
7.2 and only by a factor of 1.12 in Europe. At the backdrop of these numbers, we provide
convincing evidence that the disappointing performance of the US mutual fund industry over
the recent years is, in no small part, a manifestation of diseconomies of scale.27 Moreover,
given the trends in the faction of AuM managed by excessively overfunded funds in the US and
Europe, as observed in Figure 4, the US fund industry may come under increasing pressure.
4.5 Impact of Fees
For US equity funds, Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdú (2009) find a puzzling underperformance of
mutual funds that charge higher fees. Their finding contradicts the argument of Habib and
Johnsen (2016) that higher fees act as a signal for the unobservable quality of the costly
research by active managers. However, higher fees can also be seen as a sure loss for investors,
since they directly reduce the portfolio return when the quality of the manager is unobservable.
Thus, higher fees imply lower net returns if the costly research of the active manager does
not improve performance. To shed more light on this debate, we explore the impact of fees
by proceeding analogously to the persistence analysis of the previous section.
[Table 5 about here.]
27We also did the same analysis just for “Europe Equity Large Cap Inst.”and “US Equity Large Cap Blend
Inst.” For these two categories, the differences are even more striking. For this European investment category,
we find that over the whole sample period 72% of AuM is managed by underfunded funds, and in December
2016, this number was as high as 82%. The corresponding numbers for the US investment category are 24%
and 23%, respectively, and excessively overfunded funds managed 60% of AuM by the end of 2016.
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Using an investable benchmark, Table 5 presents the performance of active fund portfolios
that include the x% least expensive (Panel A) and the x% most expensive (Panel B) funds
of the preceding year. In Panel A, the alpha against the investable benchmark increases
for institutional equity funds from −0.23% to 0.83% and from −0.60% (−0.75%) to 0.30%
(−0.40%) for retail equity (fixed income) funds. Hence, even the alpha of retail equity funds
gets into positive territory if we exclude those funds that charge the highest fees. Again,
although a fund investor can improve the performance in their fund portfolio by including only
the least expensive funds, these improvements are statistically insignificant. For institutional
fixed income funds, the alpha first increases but then decreases for the fund portfolio with the
20% and 10% lowest fees. Interestingly, the betas of these portfolios are substantially below
one.
Panel B of Table 5 shows the performance of the portfolios with the x% most expensive
funds. If the argument of Habib and Johnsen (2016) were valid and high fees were a signal of
quality, we would expect increasing alphas the more we filter out the cheaper funds. However,
we observe the opposite. The portfolios with the 10% most expensive funds perform poorly.
For instance, the performance of the portfolio of the 10% institutional equity funds drops to
–1.14%, compared to the 10% cheapest fund with an alpha of 0.83%. For equity retail funds,
the underperformance of high-fee funds becomes significant already when we look at the 90%
most expensive funds. For the 10% most expensive retail funds, we get a highly significant
alpha of –2.83%, compared to the 10% least expensive retail funds with an alpha of 0.30%.
Hence, if we only consider the universe of the most expensive equity retail funds, active funds
are detrimental to retail investors.
[Table 6 about here.]
Given the evidence that past winners and low fee funds generate a higher average alpha
over time, we next ask whether the same pattern emerges when we control for performance
persistence and fees simultaneously. Hence, we build nine portfolios that arise from the bi-
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variate sort and the 30th and 70th percentiles for each criterion.28 Table 6 shows the results.
All active alphas are positive for the low-fee and winner portfolios except for the fixed income
retail investor. Furthermore, for all sorted portfolios, the alpha in the top right (low fee and
winner) corner is always larger than the alpha in the lower left (high fee and loser) corner.
These alphas are insignificant, except for the equity retail funds. Here, the high-fee and loser
portfolio has a highly significant negative alpha. Overall, we find that both high performance
and low fees over the past year have a positive impact on the alpha in the next year. The
result is robust in the bivariate sort of the two criteria. Especially for retail funds, an investor
is well advised to avoid high-fee loser funds as the negative alphas are highly significant under
our testing framework.
[Figure 5 about here.]
To shed further light on which funds charge higher fees, Figure 5 shows the average active
fees of the highly competitive US equity market over time together with the relative share
of index funds in terms of assets under management. As expected, we find a substantial
difference between the fees charged by retail and institutional funds, depending on the fund’s
age. Young retail funds charge the highest fees. However, the size of their fees has drastically
decreased since the recent financial crisis, converging to the level of the fees charged by older
retail funds.
Interestingly, over the whole period, young institutional funds have charged fees similar
to their older competitors. The gap between old retail and old institutional funds has been
somewhat steady over the years, slightly narrowing recently. We also find that expense ra-
tios are lower for large funds. By the end of 2016, we find that the average expense ratio
of the equal-weighted portfolio compared to the value-weighted portfolio is 21% higher for
institutional equity funds, 37% higher for retail equity funds, 17% higher for institutional
28For some small investment categories, there are time periods where none of the mutual funds belong to
a particular group. In such a case, we invest in the value-weighted portfolio of all active funds within this
category.
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fixed-income funds, and 34% higher for retail fixed-income funds. Since institutional funds
are usually larger than retail funds, this gap is consistent with the finding of Elton, Gruber,
and Blake (2012) that expense ratios are lower for larger funds. As Figure 5 suggests, over the
years, the level of fees for active funds has tended to decrease further. Thus, we find further
evidence for the zero-sum game hypothesis of Berk and Green (2004) in the sense that active
managers start to adjust their fees due to the unabated growth of index funds.
5. Conclusion
Analyzing a rich dataset from Morningstar covering 61,269 mutual funds from different regions
and asset classes from 1992 to 2016 and comparing their returns to investable benchmarks,
which we construct as portfolios of index funds. We find significant negative alphas after fees
only for the “US Equity Large Cap Blend” for institutional funds and “Canada Fixed Income”
for retail funds. For the vast majority of categories, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that
net alphas to investors are zero. Indeed, we even find categories such as “US Fixed Income”
and “Global Equity Large Cap” for institutional investors with significant p-values before fees.
At first glance, one would expect active managers to invest more carefully and take fewer
risks. We have confirmed this hypothesis by the fact that active management takes a more con-
servative position to the traditional risk factors, such as market and duration risk. However,
we find that active equity and fixed income mutual funds are affected by adverse volatility
shocks, suggesting that active managers sell protection to collect the insurance premium. Also,
averaging over the different regions, we find that the active investor has a higher sensitivity
than index funds to alternative risk premia such as small cap and credit risk.
Sorting active fund portfolios according to their performance persistence, fees, and size,
we find that low-fee winner portfolios and small winner portfolios tend to outperform, but
their alpha does not survive our test statistics. These results give further support to the
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competitive equilibrium proposed by Berk and Green (2004). Our analysis also highlights
some substantial differences between institutional and retail funds. In particular, our empirical
results suggest to active retail investors that they should avoid high-fee losers and small losers.
Their alphas are negative and statistically significant, surviving our robust test statistics
adjusted for multiple hypotheses.
27
References
Agarwal, V., and Naik, N. Y. (2004) Risks and portfolio decisions involving hedge funds, The
Review of Financial Studies 17, 63–98.
Andrikogiannopoulou, A., and Papakonstantinou, F. (2016) Estimating mutual fund skill: A
new approach, Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper .
Andrikogiannopoulou, A., and Papakonstantinou, F. (2018) Reassessing false discoveries in
mutual fund performance: Skill, luck, or lack of power?, Journal of Finance forthcoming.
Banegas, A., Gillen, B., Timmermann, A., and Wermers, R. (2013) The cross section of
conditional mutual fund performance in European stock markets, Journal of Financial
Economics 108, 699–726.
Barras, L., Scalliet, O., and Wermers, R. (2010) False discoveries in mutual fund performance:
Measuring luck in estimated alphas, Journal of Finance 65, 179–216.
Berk, J. B., and Green, R. C. (2004) Mutual fund flows and performance in rational markets,
Journal of Political Economy 112, 1269–1295.
Berk, J. B., and van Binsbergen, J. H. (2015) Measuring skill in the mutual fund industry,
Journal of Financial Economics 118, 1–20.
Berk, J. B., and van Binsbergen, J. H. (2017) Mutual funds in equilibrium, Annual Review of
Financial Economics 9, 147–167.
Bonferroni, C. E. (1936) Teoria statistica delle classi e calcolo delle probabilita (Libreria In-
ternazionale Seeber).
Carhart, M. M. (1997) On persistence in mutual fund performance, Journal of Finance 52,
57–82.
28
Chen, J., Hong, H., Huang, M., and Kubik, J. D. (2004) Does fund size erode mutual fund
performance? The role of liquidity and organization, American Economic Review 94, 1276–
1302.
Crane, A. D., and Crotty, K. (2018) Passive versus active fund performance: Do index funds
have skill?, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 53, 33–64.
Elton, E. J. (2001) A first look at the accuracy of the CRSP mutual fund database and a
comparison of the CRSP and Morningstar mutual fund databases, Journal of Finance 56,
2415–2430.
Elton, E. J., Gruber, M. J., and Blake, C. R. (2012) Does mutual fund size matter? The
relationship between size and performance, The Review of Asset Pricing Studies 2, 31–55.
Fama, E. F., and French, K. R. (1992) The cross-section of expected stock returns, Journal
of Finance 47, 427.
Fama, E. F., and French, K. R. (2010) Luck versus skill in the cross-section of mutual fund
returns, Journal of Finance 65, 1915–1947.
Ferreira, M. A., Keswani, A., Miguel, A. F., and Ramos, S. B. (2013) The determinants of
mutual fund performance: A cross-country study, Review of Finance 17, 483–525.
Frazzini, A., and Pedersen, L. H. (2014) Betting against beta, Journal of Financial Economics
111, 1–25.
French, K. R. (2008) Presidential address: The cost of active investing, Journal of Finance
63, 1537–1573.
Garleanu, N. B., and Pedersen, L. H. (2018) Efficiently inefficient markets for assets and asset
management, Journal of Finance forthcoming.
29
Genest, C., and Rémillard, B. (2004) Test of independence and randomness based on the
empirical copula process, Test 13, 335–369.
Gennaioli, N., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. (2015) Money doctors, Journal of Finance 70,
91–114.
Gerakos, J., Linnainmaa, J. T., and Morse, A. (2016) Asset managers: Institutional per-
formance and smart betas, NBER Working Papers 22982, National Bureau of Economic
Research.
Gil-Bazo, J., and Ruiz-Verdú, P. (2009) The relation between price and performance in the
mutual fund industry, The Journal of Finance 64, 2153–2183.
Habib, M. A., and Johnsen, D. B. (2016) The quality-assuring role of mutual fund advisory
fees, International Review of Law and Economics 46, 1–19.
Holm, S. (1979) A simple sequentially rejective multiple test procedure, Scandinavian Journal
of Statistics 65–70.
Jegadeesh, N., and Titman, S. (1993) Returns to buying winners and selling losers: Implica-
tions for stock market efficiency, Journal of Finance 48, 65.
Kosowski, R. (2011) Do mutual funds perform when it matters most to investors? US mutual
fund performance and risk in recessions and expansions, The Quarterly Journal of Finance
1, 607–664.
Kosowski, R., Timmermann, A., Wermers, R., and White, H. (2006) Can mutual fund “stars”
really pick stocks? New evidence from a bootstrap analysis, Journal of Finance 61, 2551–
2595.
Kuensch, H. R., and Goetze, F. (1996) Second-order correctness of the blockwise bootstrap
for stationary observations, The Annals of Statistics 24, 1914–1933.
30
Ledoit, O., and Wolf, M. (2008) Robust performance hypothesis testing with the Sharpe ratio,
Journal of Empirical Finance 15, 850–859.
Ledoit, O., and Wolf, M. (2011) Robust performances hypothesis testing with the variance,
Wilmott 2011, 86–89.
Moskowitz, T. J. (2000) Discussion, The Journal of Finance 55, 1695–1703.
Pastor, L., Stambaugh, R. F., and Taylor, L. A. (2015) Scale and skill in active management,
Journal of Financial Economics 116, 23 – 45.
Patton, A., Politis, D. N., and White, H. (2009) Correction to “Automatic block-length se-
lection for the dependent bootstrap” by D. Politis and H. White, Econometric Reviews 28,
372–375.
Pedersen, L. H. (2018) Sharpening the arithmetic of active management, Financial Analysts
Journal 74, 21–36.
Pesaran, H. M. (2004) General diagnostic tests for cross section dependence in panels, CESifo
Working Paper Series 1229, CESifo Group, Munich, Germany.
Politis, D. N., and White, H. (2004) Automatic block-length selection for the dependent
bootstrap, Econometric Reviews 23, 53–70.
Ratcliff, J. W., and Metzener, D. E. (1988) Pattern-matching: The gestalt approach, Dr Dobbs
Journal 13, 46.
Romano, J. P., and Wolf, M. (2005a) Exact and approximate stepdown methods for multiple
hypothesis testing, Journal of the American Statistical Association 100, 94–108.
Romano, J. P., and Wolf, M. (2005b) Stepwise multiple testing as formalized data snooping,
Econometrica 73, 1237–1282.
31
Romano, J. P., and Wolf, M. (2016) Efficient computation of adjusted p-values for resampling-
based stepdown multiple testing, Statistics & Probability Letters 113, 38–40.
Sharpe, W. F. (1991) The arithmetic of active management, Financial Analysts Journal 47,
7–9.
van Binsbergen, J. H., and Opp, C. C. (2019) Real anomalies, The Journal of Finance forth-
coming.
Wermers, R. (1999) Mutual fund herding and the impact on stock prices, The Journal of
Finance 54, 581–622.
Yan, X. S. (2008) Liquidity, investment style, and the relation between fund size and fund
performance, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 43, 741–767.
Zhu, M. (2018) Informative fund size, managerial skill, and investor rationality, Journal of
Financial Economics 130, 114–134.
32
A. Description of the Data
We summarize the steps for the data cleaning of the Morningstar database and provide sum-
mary statistics for the different asset classes and investment categories.
A.1 Raw Morningstar Data
Our mutual fund sample is from the Morningstar database. Recent work in Kosowski et al.
(2006); Fama and French (2010); Barras, Scalliet, and Wermers (2010) concentrates mostly
on the survivor-bias-free CRSP US Mutual Fund Database. As shown by Elton (2001), the
CRSP database also suffers from a survivorship bias: the so-called omission bias. Berk and
van Binsbergen (2015) find that neither the CRSP nor the Morningstar database are free
from errors. Thus, we must be careful, and we find the same errors as reported in this
previous paper. We focus on all funds with an Investment Type flagged by “Open-End Fund”
or “Exchange-Traded Fund” including non-survivors from December 1991 to December 2016.
We downloaded the following fields for each share class.
For the description of a share class, we retrieved the Name, ISIN, and Base Currency. It
is common to name a share class starting with the name of the asset manager, followed by a
description of the strategy, and an ending for the share class. For example, for the equity fund
“Blackrock S&P 500 Index,” there is a share class “Blackrock S&P 500 Index Institutional”
for institutional and the “Blackrock S&P 500 Index Investor A” for retail clients.
The most specific categorization in Morningstar is the Morningstar Category, which is
derived by analyzing the underlying portfolio holdings. In all, we find 504 different groups for
the retail equity and fixed income funds. The Global Category combines several Morningstar
categories, and we see a total of 68 groups for retail equity and fixed income funds. For exam-
ple, the Global Category category “Europe Equity Large Cap” includes Morningstar categories,
such as “EAA Fund Europe Large-Cap Blend Equity,” “EAA Fund Europe Large-Cap Value
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Equity,” “EAA Fund Europe Large-Cap Growth Equity,” but also “US Fund Europe Stock” or
“Canada Fund European Equity.” Since we have within this broader categorization a higher
chance of finding both index and equity funds, we concentrate on the Global Category. The
Global Broad Category Group further aggregates the Global Category into the major asset
classes. Since we focus on the comparison of active and index funds, we concentrate on the
Global Broad Category Group “Equity” and “Fixed Income” funds. We thereby disregard cat-
egories such as “Allocation,” “Money Market,” or “Commodities” because for them there are
insufficiently many index funds to make a fair comparison.
For the computation of the returns, we downloaded the following fields for each fund:
Monthly Return USD, Monthly Gross Return USD, and Net Assets - share class (Monthly)
USD. The Monthly Return USD includes management, administrative, and other costs that
are deducted from the NAV, such as the 12b-1 fee. All income and capital gains are reinvested
monthly. The Monthly Gross Return USD is based on the Monthly Return USD and adds the
most recent net expense ratio. The Net Assets - share class (Monthly) USD is the monthly
total net assets of a share class.
To distinguish between active and index funds, we make use of the Index Fund field. Those
funds that track a particular index based on full replication or based on a representative
sampling are flagged by Morningstar as index funds. Next, to filter the institutional and
retail funds, we downloaded the field Institutional, which defines any fund as institutional if
it either says “institutional” in the name of its share class, has a minimum investment above
USD 100,000, or the prospectus says that it is for institutional investors only.
A.2 Data Cleaning
For each fund, we retrieved its monthly net return, gross return, and total net assets, all in
US dollars. We only included an observation if all three items were available. Often, and as
reported in Berk and van Binsbergen (2015), we observe that net assets are reported quarterly
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or are missing for a specific month. In this case, we roll the assets under the assumptions of
zero net flows, so as to increase the available data points and avoid disconnected time-series.
Besides, for some institutional mutual funds, we observe zero fees because they are paid in
separate contracts with the asset manager. Thus, we only include funds where the sum of the
gross returns is larger than the sum of the net returns to exclude zero-fees funds. To avoid
the incubation bias, we include funds only if they reach 5 million December 2016 US dollars
in AUM.
We also see conversion errors, where funds assets suddenly increase by a high factor and
then decrease again by a similar factor. First, we observe this behavior in emerging market
currencies before 1999. Thus, we concentrate in the period before 1999 only on the developed
currencies, Pound Sterling, US Dollar, Euro, Singapore Dollar, Australian Dollar, Swedish
Krona, South African Rand, Swiss Franc, Japanese Yen, New Zealand Dollar, Canadian Dol-
lar, Norwegian Krone, Danish Krone. Also, we see that for some funds, the assets change
by a factor higher than 100 and decrease in the next period to the same level as before the
outlier. For these cases, we smooth the net assets over time if we see that the assets change
by a factor higher than 10 and we decrease them in the next two periods by a factor of more
than 0.5. But there are funds where this increase is verified by attaining the same fund levels
in the future. Therefore, we only correct the assets if the same level is not exceeded in its
future assets.
We also delete obvious mistakes, such as when an index fund shows high fees in the past
and suddenly changes to a low fee. In this case, we keep only the low fee period, since we
interpret this as being that either the fees were not correct or the fund changed from active
to index. When we build the value-weighted portfolio for the investment categories, we also
remove funds that show a beta below 0.05 relative to the average return of all the funds within
the same investment category. Because of the low sensitivity to the average fund, these funds
are not following a strategy similar to that of the rest of the group.
35
A.3 Aggregation of the Share Classes
Each line in the Morningstar dataset corresponds to a share class. In all, we obtain 435,453
lines of different share classes. Thus, we must aggregate the same share classes to avoid
multiple tries of investment strategies by the same provider. First, we tried to use the fields
Administrator and Ticker of Fund’s Oldest Share Class; however, they are often missing.
For this reason, we aggregated alphabetically subsequent mutual funds that are in the same
Morningstar Category with the corresponding Index Fund flag and have a similar name. While
Berk and van Binsbergen (2015) use the last word of the fund’s name for the share class, we use
the ratio provided by the SequenceMatcher of the difflib library in Python, which is based on
the algorithm developed by Ratcliff and Metzener (1988) and, additionally, cleans the “junk”
elements. We define two names to be similar if this ratio is above 0.8.
A.4 Summary Statistics of Investment Categories
Table 1 shows the summary statistics of the cross-sectional monthly attributes across asset
classes. Table A.1 provides a more detailed view of all the investment categories, where we
find both index and active mutual funds. For the active funds, we analyze a total of 14,969
institutional and 46,300 retail funds, of which 56,136 are active funds and 5,133 are index
funds. In general, there are fewer index funds, but they have higher average total net assets
(TNA) and net returns, and also lower fees and about the same average number of years in the
database. As expected, the institutional funds charge lower fees than their retail counterparts.
[Table A.1 about here.]
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B. The Robust Alpha Test
Consider a fund with time-t return yt and a set of K benchmark factor returns xtk, k = 1, ..., K.
A total of T returns are observed. We assume that these observations are generated by a





























































with the observed means µ̂ and sample covariance matrix Σ̂. By defining a vector µX =
(0, E[x1], · · · , E[xK ])′, we can express the fund’s alpha as













1 E[x1] E[x2] · · · E[xK ]
E[x1] E[x
2










































Then, we test for the hypothesis
H0 : α = 0 against H1 : α 6= 0. (B.4)
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Furthermore, we define ζk = E[yxk], γk = E[x
2
k], ξkj = E[xkxj], j > k, and the combined vec-
tor ν = (µy, · · · , µxk , · · · , ζk, · · · , γk, · · · , ξkj, · · · )′ ∈ R1+3k+k(k−1)/2 with sample counterpart
ν̂. Now, we can express the true alpha as a function f of ν:
α = E[y]− µ′XΣ−1XXyX = f(ν); (B.5)
and the estimated alpha as function of ν̂: α̂ = f(ν̂). As mentioned in Ledoit and Wolf (2008),
under mild regularity conditions,
√
T (ν̂ − ν) d−→ N(0,Ψ), (B.6)
where Ψ is an unknown symmetric positive semi-definite matrix. By the delta method, we
obtain
√







, · · · , ∂f(v)
∂µxk
, · · · , ∂f(v)
∂ζk
, · · · , ∂f(v)
∂γk
, · · · , ∂f(v)
∂ξkj
, · · ·
)
.′ (B.8)






To test the null hypothesis in Equation (B.4), we focus on the bootstrap inference for time-
series data outlined in Ledoit and Wolf (2008). In particular, we denote the optimal block
length by b and define l = floor(T/b). As shown in Kuensch and Goetze (1996), the boot-






























and the p-value is
PV =
{d̃∗m ≥ d̂}+ 1
M + 1
, (B.13)
where d̂ is the original studentized test statistic that was computed from the observed returns.
We use Newey–West standard errors to calculate the original standard errors. Regarding the
optimal block, we suggest using either the method of Politis and White (2004) and Patton,
Politis, and White (2009) for the univariate case, or the method of Ledoit and Wolf (2008)
for the bivariate case. For our empirical analysis, we would like to compare up to 30 different
investment categories and, so far, there is no available method to make this comparison.
Consequently, we will further discuss the optimal block size to use in our simulations in
Appendix C.
C. Accuracy of the Robust Alpha Test
We now present the results of a simulation study to show the difference between our robust
alpha test and the standard hypothesis tests. For this purpose, we first simulate a single
hypothesis setting. For realistic time-series, we select the first ten US mutual funds of the
Morningstar database within the category “US Equity Large Cap Blend” that offer the entire
return history from 1992 to 2016 (T=300). As benchmark models, we focus on the one-factor
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“CAPM,” i.e., the market excess return, the three-factor “FF3,” and the five-factor “FF5”
model. For the data generating process (DGP), we sample from the realized returns with
a circular block bootstrap and block sizes of 1, 3, and 6. We selected this grid of block
sizes based on our analysis in Section 2, where we observe that most of the optimal circular
block sizes range from one to six. This grid corresponds to time periods of one, three, and
six months. The block sizes of three and six are the ones that take the evidence of serial
dependence from Section 2 into account. A block size of one generates independent data, and
we employ this block size only for reasons of comparison. For each fund, we simulate 1,000
paths and set the alpha under the null hypothesis to the true observed alpha of the data. The
bootstrapped p-values (Boot) are then calculated as illustrated in Appendix B by employing
M = 1,000 and the optimal block size by the method of Politis and White (2004) and the
correction of Patton, Politis, and White (2009). We compare the robust p-values with those
from the standard inference methods; that is, based on the normal distribution (Standard),
Newey–West (NW), and HC3 standard errors.
[Table C.1 about here.]
Table C.1 shows the empirical rejection probabilities of the falsely rejected null hypothesis
compared to the nominal levels α = 10%, α = 5%, and α = 1%. Because the null hypothesis
is true for all the simulations, the true rejection probabilities should be equal to the nominal
levels of the test. If a test shows a higher percentage of rejections, then we regard this
test as too liberal. While we observe that the standard inference tests based on the normal
distribution, the Newey–West, and HC3 standard errors are too liberal in rejecting the null
hypothesis, the bootstrapped solution (Boot) presented in the previous section is close to
the nominal levels. We highlight in bold the empirical rejection probabilities that are closest
to the desired level. We observe the HC3 standard errors to be in some cases closer to the
desired level than are those of the block bootstrapped method, but only in the case where
we apply the standard but less realistic bootstrap with a block size of one where we lose any
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dependence over time. However, as we demonstrate in Section 2, the optimal block size, and
thus a realistic assumption for the DGP is, in general, around three or six, for which our
bootstrapped test is tailored to be more accurate. A similar observation was also made in
Ledoit and Wolf (2008) for testing the Sharpe Ratio and in Ledoit and Wolf (2011) for the
variance.
Since there is still the open question of the optimal block size in the multiple hypothesis
setting when controlling the FWER, as illustrated in Romano and Wolf (2005a,b, 2016), we
conduct a second simulations study. To this end, we must consider the cross-dependence
structure, and jointly sample the funds and benchmark returns. For this purpose, we focus
on the 17 portfolios within the “Inv. Categories” setting from Section 2 with the investable
one-factor benchmark model that is based on the value-weighted return of index funds. Also,
instead of calculating the Type I Errors as in the single hypothesis setting, we compute the
empirical rejection probabilities based on the FWER, as illustrated in Romano and Wolf
(2005a,b, 2016). To find the optimal block size that is closest to the nominal levels of the test,
we focus on the following grid of block sizes: 1, 3, 6, 9, and 12. Regarding the DGP, we keep
the grid from our first simulation study.
[Table C.2 about here.]
Table C.2 shows the empirical rejection probabilities based on the FWER. Likewise, for the
FWER, we find the bootstrapped robust alpha test to achieve the desired levels at optimal
block sizes three or six. Given that for a block size of three we observe accurate rejection
probabilities, in the multiple comparisons of portfolios, we will, in the remainder of the paper,
present the results based on the optimal block size of three. Finally, the more conservative
block sizes six and nine are applied for robustness checks.
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Figure 1: Value-weighted alpha of active mutual funds within investment categories
Multiple hypotheses adjusted p-value (y-axis) and annualized value-weighted alpha of active versus
index funds (x-axis) for all investment categories as defined by the “Global Category” of Morningstar.
Top (bottom): analysis after (before) management fees. We form the four groups with the combina-
tions retail and institutional as well as the periods 1992–2016 and 2000–2016.
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Figure 2: Aggregated skill and fee in US dollars
Added value from active management (skill) and fee for the retail (top) and institutional funds
(bottom) in US dollars. The skill is defined as the value added in US dollars of active minus index
investing among the different investment categories. The fee is aggregated total management fee in
US dollars that was paid by active investors. We distinguish between retail and institutional funds,
US and non-US funds, as well as equity and fixed income investment categories. The analysis is in
Y2016 billion US dollars.
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Figure 3: Aggregated value-weighted alpha of active minus index
Cumulated logarithmic alphas for the active equity (top) and fixed income (bottom) mutual funds.
The alpha is the value-weighted return of the active funds against the value-weighted return of the
index funds within the same investment category. The figure shows the aggregated alpha with equal-
weights (EW) and value-weights (VW) across the Morningstar investment categories. We analyze
both institutional and retail funds. We also regard the portfolios before (Gross) and after (Net)
costs. We include all mutual funds within Morningstar where net and gross returns and assets under
management are available, and where we have at least one index fund within the same investment
category. The analysis is in US dollars.
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Figure 4: Fraction of underfunded and overfunded mutual equity funds
Fractions of the number (#) of funds and assets under management (AuM), and absolute AuM in
December 2016 US dollars. The graphs shows the corresponding figures for US (left) and European
(right) equity funds. We differentiate between excessively and moderately overfunded, and under-
funded mutual funds following Zhu (2018).
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Figure 5: Active equity fees of young and old funds in the US
Average active fee over the last year (top) of US equity funds with a track record of more than five
years (>5y) and with a track record of at most one year (<1y), and the percentage of index funds
(bottom) within all US equity mutual funds. We distinguish between retail and institutional funds.
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Table 1: Mutual fund database summary statistics
Total number, average number (Avg Number), the average total net assets in million USD (Avg
TNA), average annual net return in USD (Avg Net Ret), average annual fee in USD (Avg Fees ann),
and the average years of a fund in the database (Avg Years) over the time period from December
1991 to December 2016 of all available funds in the Morningstar database flagged by Open-End or
Exchange-Traded funds. We only include funds within the “Global Broad Category Group” equity
(Equity) and fixed income (Fixed Income) for which we provide the category statistics. The average
corresponds to the mean of cross-sectional monthly attributes.
in USD Total Number Avg Number Avg TNA Avg Net Ret Avg Fees ann Avg Years
Active Index Active Index Active Index Active Index Active Index Active Index
Equity Inst. 8,488 691 2,506.1 199.5 255.3 910.0 8.85% 8.95% 0.86% 0.15% 7.4 7.2
Retail 26,741 3,551 9,147.8 950.6 453.6 732.2 8.16% 8.27% 1.18% 0.31% 8.6 6.7
Fixed Inst. 5,566 224 1,440.3 57.8 333.2 663.0 4.97% 5.19% 0.54% 0.19% 6.5 6.5
Income Retail 15,341 667 4,545.6 152.6 346.7 817.6 4.87% 5.20% 0.88% 0.25% 7.4 5.7
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Table 2: Performance drivers of active minus index
Results from regressing the difference between value-weighted active investing and index investing,
before fees. For the benchmark model, we include the difference between the VIX index and the
regional equity model with the regional MKT, SMB, HML, WML, and BAB factors. For the regional
fixed income model, we add the VIX index to the four local factors shift, twist, and butterfly (BFLY),
as well as the AAA–BBB credit spread (SPR). Coefficient estimates are multiplied by 100 and HC3
standard errors are in parentheses. By ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ we denote p-values below 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01,
respectively. The last rows report the adjusted R2 values.
Panel A: Equity funds
Retail Asia ex- Institutional Asia ex-
US Global Europe Japan Japan US Global Europe Japan Japan
Const. −0.01 0.27∗∗∗ 0.04 0.10 −0.15 −0.06∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.07 0.07 0.17
(0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.09) (0.20) (0.03) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.15)
MKT −2.41∗∗ −7.07∗∗∗ 4.04∗∗ 1.88 3.97 −0.25 −2.80∗∗ 1.34 2.37 −4.71∗
(1.09) (1.90) (1.60) (2.56) (6.05) (1.08) (1.28) (1.90) (1.62) (2.49)
SMB 13.77∗∗∗ 14.87∗∗∗ 23.14∗∗∗ 7.58∗∗ 6.73 26.39∗∗∗ 14.72∗∗∗ 35.59∗∗∗ 15.63∗∗∗ 22.50∗∗∗
(1.84) (2.93) (3.10) (3.77) (4.94) (1.53) (2.04) (4.33) (3.29) (4.98)
HML −6.93∗∗∗ −3.85 −8.32∗∗∗−12.41∗∗∗ 13.73∗∗∗ −3.95∗∗ −0.57 2.15 −1.19 22.73∗∗∗
(1.74) (2.69) (2.29) (3.27) (4.95) (1.77) (2.25) (3.09) (3.07) (5.42)
WML 2.73∗ 4.78∗∗∗ 2.75∗ 12.47∗∗∗ −0.47 2.09∗ 2.01 5.88∗∗∗ −1.54 0.20
(1.42) (1.61) (1.57) (3.26) (4.25) (1.26) (1.28) (1.83) (2.46) (3.79)
BAB 0.41 −9.50∗∗∗ −6.51∗∗∗ −3.00 5.51 0.39 0.28 −6.59∗∗∗ −8.60∗∗∗−12.41∗∗
(1.52) (2.61) (1.75) (2.55) (6.61) (1.34) (1.99) (2.28) (2.39) (5.84)
∆VIX −3.46∗∗∗ −7.16∗∗∗ −2.94∗ −3.38 7.63 −2.39∗∗ −3.57∗∗∗ −3.68∗∗ −3.48∗ −4.02
(0.98) (2.00) (1.75) (2.36) (6.11) (1.05) (1.34) (1.69) (1.80) (3.51)
R2 0.51 0.20 0.26 0.25 0.08 0.73 0.18 0.45 0.22 0.21
Panel B: Fixed income funds
Retail Institutional
USD CHF EUR GBP USD CHF EUR GBP
Const. 0.05∗∗∗ 0.02 0.03∗ 0.13∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ −0.00 0.02 0.08∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04)
SHIFT −0.91∗∗∗ −2.21∗∗∗ −2.73∗∗∗ −2.48∗∗∗ −0.71∗∗∗ −0.50∗∗∗ −2.26∗∗∗ −0.23
(0.09) (0.27) (0.17) (0.48) (0.17) (0.09) (0.24) (0.36)
TWIST −0.33∗ −0.82 −0.09 −1.40 −1.33∗∗∗ −0.37∗∗ −0.27 1.11∗
(0.17) (0.57) (0.26) (1.45) (0.29) (0.16) (0.45) (0.59)
BFLY −0.30 0.99∗ 0.76 2.40 −0.72 −0.31 0.85 1.09
(0.32) (0.51) (0.60) (2.26) (0.59) (0.28) (0.96) (1.23)
SPR 1.27∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗ 0.27 3.81∗∗∗ 1.13∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗ −0.11 1.60∗∗∗
(0.21) (0.14) (0.22) (0.90) (0.33) (0.06) (0.30) (0.47)
∆VIX −1.86∗∗ −2.97∗∗∗ −1.17 −5.34∗ −1.40 −0.17 −2.86∗∗ −0.90
(0.73) (1.01) (0.81) (2.91) (1.19) (0.24) (1.20) (1.78)
R2 0.82 0.59 0.81 0.72 0.63 0.25 0.63 0.49
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Table 3: One-year persistence of the alpha after fees
Annualized alpha after fees (in %), the corresponding block-bootstrapped multiple hypothesis ad-
justed p-value (in brackets), and the beta for the value-weighted performance of active mutual funds
benchmarked against the value-weighted performance of index funds. In Panel A, each row from
100% to 10% corresponds to the value-weighted portfolio including only the x% best active mutual
funds of the past year based on the t-value for the alpha. In Panel B, we report the same numbers but
for the x% worst active mutual funds of the past year. Every December, we rebalance the momentum
portfolios. The data sample ranges from 1993 to 2016. Alphas with p-values below 10% are in italics
and p-values below 5% are in bold.
Panel A: Value-weighted performance of the x% best performing funds






Inst. alpha −0.23 −0.12 −0.12 −0.10 −0.01 0.07 0.07 0.11 0.40 0.62
(0.78) (0.94) (0.94) (0.95) (0.98) (0.97) (0.97) (0.97) (0.73) (0.65)
beta 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.98
Retail alpha −0.60 −0.46 −0.44 −0.41 −0.44 −0.40 −0.31 −0.27 −0.13 −0.02
(0.30) (0.52) (0.52) (0.53) (0.52) (0.53) (0.64) (0.71) (0.91) (0.97)







e Inst. alpha 0.26 0.32 0.35 0.33 0.30 0.28 0.27 0.22 0.13 0.16
(0.75) (0.68) (0.59) (0.59) (0.66) (0.68) (0.68) (0.75) (0.75) (0.75)
beta 0.88 0.87 0.86 0.86 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.84 0.80 0.78
Retail alpha −0.75 −0.73 −0.70 −0.70 −0.67 −0.62 −0.56 −0.55 −0.58 −0.40
(0.21) (0.24) (0.26) (0.26) (0.25) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.22) (0.26)
beta 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.94 0.93 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.89
Panel B: Value-weighted performance of the x% worst performing funds






Inst. alpha −0.23 −0.24 −0.30 −0.32 −0.40 −0.51 −0.51 −0.65 −1.01 −0.94
(0.64) (0.64) (0.64) (0.64) (0.60) (0.56) (0.58) (0.46) (0.24) (0.43)
beta 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99
Retail alpha −0.60 −0.63 −0.72 −0.77 −0.80 −0.79 −0.88 −1.04 −1.08 −1.39
(0.27) (0.27) (0.26) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.19) (0.17) (0.04)







e Inst. alpha 0.26 0.26 0.13 0.23 0.14 0.13 0.16 0.14 −0.08 −0.26
(0.77) (0.78) (0.96) (0.85) (0.96) (0.96) (0.94) (0.96) (0.96) (0.80)
beta 0.88 0.89 0.90 0.91 0.91 0.93 0.94 0.96 0.96 0.98
Retail alpha −0.75 −0.77 −0.84 −0.93 −0.96 −0.96 −0.96 −0.84 −0.93 −0.84
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.17) (0.11) (0.09)
beta 0.97 0.98 0.99 1.01 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.03 1.02 1.00
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Table 4: Bivariate sorts on the performance and size of the past year
Annualized alpha after fees (in %) and block-bootstrapped multiple hypothesis adjusted p-value (in
brackets) for the value-weighted performance of active mutual funds against the investable benchmark.
The portfolios of active mutual funds are double-sorted based on the performance (rows) and the size
(columns) of the past year. The nine portfolios arise from the 30th and 70th percentiles within the
investment category of each fund. For each panel we distinguish between equity (top) and fixed income
(bottom) funds. We rebalance the portfolios every year starting in December 1992 to December 2016.
Alphas with p-values below 10% are in italics and p-values below 5% are in bold.
Institutional Retail
Small Medium Big Small Medium Big
Equity Winner 0.71 0.83 −0.05 Winner 0.09 −0.45 −0.28
(0.76) (0.54) (0.96) (0.89) (0.60) (0.74)
Average 0.65 −0.11 −0.22 Average −1.15 −0.96 −0.66
(0.74) (0.96) (0.93) (0.17) (0.17) (0.44)
Loser −0.76 −0.42 −0.65 Loser −1.78 −1.53 −0.99
(0.69) (0.93) (0.70) (0.07) (0.05) (0.30)
Fixed Income Winner 0.59 −0.25 0.25 Winner −0.61 −0.49 −0.56
(0.60) (0.86) (0.84) (0.20) (0.27) (0.27)
Average −0.31 −0.14 0.37 Average −1.00 −0.86 −0.93
(0.86) (0.92) (0.80) (0.13) (0.21) (0.27)
Loser −0.66 −0.13 0.20 Loser −1.25 −1.05 −0.79
(0.63) (0.92) (0.92) (0.06) (0.12) (0.27)
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Table 5: Portfolios filtered by the fee of the past year.
Annualized alpha after fees (in %), the corresponding block-bootstrapped multiple hypothesis ad-
justed p-value (in brackets), and the beta for the value-weighted performance of active mutual funds
against the investable benchmark. Panel A shows the value-weighted performance of portfolios con-
sisting of the x% least expensive active mutual funds of the past year. Panel B shows the performance
of the x% most expensive active mutual funds. Every December, the portfolios are rebalanced to
exclude a certain percentage of active funds. The data sample ranges from 1993 to 2016. Alphas
with p-values below 10% are in italics and p-values below 5% are in bold.
Panel A: Value-weighted performance of the x% least expensive funds






Inst. alpha −0.23 −0.13 −0.11 −0.05 −0.04 0.09 0.04 0.17 0.49 0.83
(0.66) (0.82) (0.84) (0.96) (0.96) (0.86) (0.96) (0.74) (0.26) (0.15)
beta 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.97
Retail alpha −0.60 −0.50 −0.44 −0.40 −0.33 −0.24 −0.15 −0.04 0.03 0.30
(0.23) (0.35) (0.42) (0.48) (0.58) (0.66) (0.80) (0.97) (0.97) (0.62)







e Inst. alpha 0.26 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.35 0.33 0.35 0.39 0.25 0.01
(0.69) (0.61) (0.61) (0.56) (0.52) (0.52) (0.46) (0.37) (0.61) (0.96)
0.88 0.88 0.87 0.87 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.81 0.72
Retail alpha −0.75 −0.71 −0.66 −0.63 −0.61 −0.56 −0.55 −0.53 −0.42 −0.40
(0.17) (0.19) (0.20) (0.20) (0.22) (0.25) (0.26) (0.28) (0.36) (0.36)
0.97 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.94
Panel B: Value-weighted performance of the x% most expensive funds






Inst. alpha −0.23 −0.36 −0.52 −0.50 −0.48 −0.78 −0.65 −0.94 −0.88 −1.14
(0.50) (0.36) (0.30) (0.32) (0.34) (0.20) (0.32) (0.22) (0.30) (0.20)
beta 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.02 1.03 1.04
Retail alpha −0.60 −0.99 −1.28 −1.53 −1.70 −1.82 −1.94 −2.10 −2.48 −2.83
(0.15) (0.03) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)







e Inst. alpha 0.26 0.31 0.22 0.10 0.10 0.15 0.06 0.08 −0.11 −0.26
(0.66) (0.60) (0.77) (0.95) (0.95) (0.92) (0.97) (0.97) (0.97) (0.84)
0.88 0.89 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.92 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.88
Retail alpha −0.75 −0.83 −0.91 −0.92 −0.95 −1.02 −1.02 −1.08 −1.37 −1.46
(0.16) (0.16) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.16) (0.16) (0.14) (0.14)
0.97 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.02 1.00
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Table 6: Bivariate sorts on the performance and fee of the past year
Annualized alpha after fees (in %) and block-bootstrapped multiple hypothesis adjusted p-value (in
brackets) for the value-weighted performance of active mutual funds against the investable benchmark.
The portfolios of active mutual funds are double-sorted based on the performance (rows) and the fee
(columns) of the past year. The nine portfolios arise from the 30th and 70th percentiles within the
investment category of each fund. For each panel we distinguish between equity (top) and fixed income
(bottom) funds. We rebalance the portfolios every year starting in December 1992 to December 2016.
Alphas with p-values below 10% are in italics and p-values below 5% are in bold.
Institutional Retail
High Fee Medium Low Fee High Fee Medium Low Fee
Equity Winner −0.03 −0.19 0.44 Winner −1.78 −1.03 0.14
(0.99) (0.99) (0.92) (0.08) (0.16) (0.93)
Average −1.15 −0.16 −0.14 Average −2.13 −1.24 −0.18
(0.33) (0.99) (0.99) (0.00) (0.06) (0.93)
Loser −1.61 −1.41 0.25 Loser −2.38 −1.55 −0.43
(0.33) (0.23) (0.99) (0.00) (0.05) (0.81)
Fixed Income Winner 0.10 0.33 0.17 Winner −0.85 −0.60 −0.42
(1.00) (0.77) (0.91) (0.37) (0.35) (0.37)
Average 0.17 −0.01 0.49 Average −1.20 −0.96 −0.74
(1.00) (1.00) (0.57) (0.35) (0.22) (0.37)
Loser −0.07 0.04 0.40 Loser −1.17 −0.79 −0.71
(1.00) (1.00) (0.91) (0.22) (0.35) (0.37)
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Table A.1: Summary statistics for mutual fund investment categories
Average number (Avg Number) of funds, average total net assets in million USD (Avg TNA), average
annual net return in USD (Avg Net Ret), average number of years the fund is in the database
(Avg Years), and the first appearance of an index fund, for the time period from December 1991
to December 2016, for all available investment categories (Global Category) within the Morningstar
database. We only include funds within the “Global Broad Category Group” equity or fixed income
that are flagged as “Open-End” or “Exchange-Traded” funds. The average corresponds to the mean
of cross-sectional monthly attributes.
in USD Avg Number Avg TNA Avg Net Ret Avg Years First Index
Active Index Active Index Active Index Active Index Fund
Mexico Fixed Income Retail 182.3 2.0 233.7 137.4 -1.89% 1.28% 5.8 7.5 May 09
Global Equity Large Cap
Inst. 363.2 25.8 435.8 685.3 6.73% 6.17% 7.1 6.0 Jul 94
Retail 1,093.9 57.6 466.4 603.6 6.22% 5.99% 7.5 5.6 Jan 92
Mexico Equity
Inst. 22.7 6.2 80.0 26.4 8.93% 9.33% 6.8 6.7 Feb 04
Retail 26.0 10.6 70.7 297.7 7.01% 9.55% 7.0 8.5 Feb 04
Global Fixed Income
Inst. 329.7 21.6 295.9 241.4 4.36% 3.85% 5.2 5.2 Apr 03
Retail 1,104.1 33.9 201.9 242.3 2.63% 2.68% 5.5 4.4 Apr 05
Europe Equity Large Cap
Inst. 211.9 24.5 126.2 427.5 6.97% 6.34% 6.0 6.0 Jan 98
Retail 812.6 73.8 237.7 425.9 6.71% 7.33% 7.9 6.6 Jan 92
Euro Fixed Income
Inst. 349.7 19.1 298.7 638.7 2.43% 3.40% 6.0 6.6 Apr 04
Retail 1,103.6 23.7 354.7 241.2 3.83% 5.71% 8.3 5.6 Jan 92
US Equity Small Cap
Inst. 234.2 13.3 252.6 459.8 11.88% 11.12% 9.6 9.5 Oct 92
Retail 456.0 43.0 280.5 580.4 10.78% 10.85% 11.0 10.2 Jan 92
Global Equity
Inst. 165.0 2.1 251.2 236.9 3.86% 0.04% 5.5 5.1 Jun 07
Retail 382.6 19.5 706.9 224.1 6.68% 5.65% 9.0 5.7 Aug 95
High Yield Fixed Income Retail 954.2 16.7 307.3 197.2 4.57% 3.24% 5.1 3.6 Dec 07
Other Fixed Income
Inst. 214.3 4.2 237.7 78.5 2.16% 3.09% 4.3 4.1 Apr 05
Retail 651.8 10.8 202.0 59.6 2.12% 2.39% 4.6 3.3 Apr 05
US Equity Mid Cap
Inst. 188.1 10.8 254.7 848.5 10.89% 11.92% 9.0 7.5 Dec 92
Retail 487.2 39.3 450.5 778.7 10.02% 11.00% 10.5 7.5 Jan 92
Other Europe Equity
Inst. 78.7 10.5 95.9 665.1 7.49% 6.10% 6.5 7.0 Dec 98
Retail 547.9 68.6 281.7 209.3 9.03% 8.24% 9.1 8.0 Jan 92
Financials Sector Equity
Inst. 22.2 2.4 25.7 46.4 5.59% 3.74% 7.3 10.1 Mar 04
Retail 113.0 32.8 138.8 114.9 5.29% 5.60% 8.7 6.9 Feb 01
Africa Fixed Income
Inst. 73.7 1.6 131.6 11.0 3.69% 3.65% 5.6 6.6 Jan 09
Retail 90.5 1.7 90.7 22.5 5.02% 5.81% 6.3 3.4 Nov 08
Islamic Equity Retail 70.5 9.5 76.4 31.0 3.65% 3.29% 6.8 7.3 Feb 07
Other Sector Equity
Inst. 69.1 1.6 56.2 24.4 4.08% 4.84% 5.3 4.4 Mar 07
Retail 262.4 40.7 124.0 136.6 4.46% 2.02% 6.2 5.1 Nov 05
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Table A.1 (continued)
in USD Avg Number Avg TNA Avg Net Ret Avg Years First Index
Active Index Active Index Active Index Active Index Fund
Africa Equity
Inst. 106.9 6.8 70.7 12.3 0.66% 2.53% 5.5 4.4 Nov 07
Retail 145.6 17.6 94.6 71.4 12.94% 13.52% 7.3 6.5 Apr 03
Technology Sector Equity
Inst. 38.9 5.3 57.3 29.2 8.94% 7.29% 6.5 9.6 Apr 04
Retail 165.8 20.7 295.4 182.8 12.51% 11.56% 9.3 8.0 Jan 92
Energy Sector Equity
Inst. 40.5 1.9 103.9 145.9 6.84% 9.06% 5.7 7.8 Nov 04
Retail 120.9 22.2 219.4 249.5 6.83% 7.39% 8.0 6.7 Jul 00
US Equity Large Cap Growth
Inst. 255.3 6.2 378.6 757.8 6.57% 5.32% 8.8 7.2 Jun 98
Retail 551.4 21.8 1’229.6 809.9 8.65% 9.82% 11.0 8.1 Dec 92
US Equity Large Cap Value
Inst. 194.3 4.8 415.7 863.6 7.10% 7.16% 8.3 8.0 Aug 98
Retail 381.8 21.8 1’006.4 758.0 8.62% 10.15% 10.6 6.9 Dec 92
US Fixed Income
Inst. 403.3 16.5 573.4 1’387.8 4.92% 5.35% 9.7 8.6 Jan 92
Retail 843.9 50.5 540.4 1’540.5 4.59% 5.26% 10.6 7.6 Jan 92
Other Europe Fixed Income
Inst. 81.6 13.3 233.5 1’000.8 5.85% 6.63% 6.8 7.7 Nov 01
Retail 263.2 7.7 327.7 185.2 4.30% 5.32% 8.2 6.9 Mar 98
US Equity Large Cap Blend
Inst. 233.1 54.6 289.9 2’019.1 8.68% 9.27% 8.4 9.8 Jan 92
Retail 692.4 146.2 629.6 1’912.6 7.84% 8.98% 9.1 8.7 Jan 92
Asia Equity
Inst. 23.4 1.2 86.3 750.2 3.19% 3.91% 6.1 10.2 Jun 00
Retail 111.5 6.2 142.0 758.8 4.66% 2.69% 9.1 6.7 Jan 92
Real Estate Sector Equity
Inst. 163.0 12.9 221.8 359.3 9.28% 8.21% 7.1 6.0 Feb 04
Retail 268.8 26.8 162.3 628.0 9.86% 10.51% 8.2 6.3 Jun 96
Inflation Linked
Inst. 108.6 8.2 303.9 222.0 3.07% 3.46% 6.5 4.8 Feb 04
Retail 160.9 15.8 284.4 391.6 4.03% 4.60% 7.8 6.2 Dec 98
Emerging Markets Fixed Income
Inst. 457.1 2.5 261.1 205.3 -0.82% 4.03% 2.8 1.8 Jun 13
Retail 457.5 9.2 174.8 500.0 5.40% 7.32% 5.5 3.8 Mar 04
Emerging Markets Equity
Inst. 231.6 10.6 372.5 495.3 8.64% 8.56% 6.3 4.7 Jul 00
Retail 417.3 29.5 214.4 427.7 7.69% 7.13% 7.5 5.1 May 92
Asia ex-Japan Equity
Inst. 115.1 10.1 155.3 169.1 12.09% 11.28% 6.0 7.3 Apr 03
Retail 282.9 16.4 176.6 96.0 5.82% 7.09% 7.3 6.3 Nov 94
Greater China Equity
Inst. 94.1 2.3 71.7 43.5 10.84% 11.45% 5.2 4.5 Apr 09
Retail 234.5 94.5 188.5 1’084.6 10.27% 10.73% 5.7 4.1 Jan 01
Japan Equity
Inst. 85.5 10.8 129.3 253.5 1.78% 2.31% 5.7 5.4 May 00
Retail 300.9 37.6 262.0 301.1 3.84% 3.28% 6.9 5.9 Feb 98
UK Equity Large Cap
Inst. 59.1 8.1 324.4 542.7 5.32% 4.55% 6.1 6.4 Jan 06
Retail 170.6 36.8 423.9 445.4 3.86% 3.52% 6.3 7.3 Nov 99
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Table A.1 (continued)
in USD Avg Number Avg TNA Avg Net Ret Avg Years First Index
Active Index Active Index Active Index Active Index Fund
Global Equity Mid/Small Cap
Inst. 103.3 3.3 344.8 223.4 11.47% 13.73% 4.9 4.3 May 09
Retail 288.3 9.8 230.3 223.5 4.34% 6.45% 6.4 5.2 Jul 06
Asia Fixed Income
Inst. 30.6 2.5 85.6 292.8 3.89% 1.81% 4.6 9.9 Apr 05
Retail 268.6 6.8 163.8 110.8 5.72% 4.50% 4.9 3.7 Jan 06
Cons. Goods & Serv. Sect. Eq.
Inst. 16.5 9.8 85.4 23.7 8.22% 7.30% 5.3 9.7 Mar 04
Retail 97.0 32.0 98.2 210.0 7.41% 6.28% 7.1 7.4 Jul 00
Sterling Fixed Income
Inst. 51.7 6.1 275.6 98.6 2.63% 2.04% 5.5 7.1 Apr 05
Retail 169.7 15.3 447.3 457.7 1.72% 2.18% 6.2 5.8 Apr 05
Europe Equity Mid/Small Cap
Inst. 130.1 1.3 103.5 64.1 7.95% 6.91% 2.7 2.7 Dec 12
Retail 350.2 7.8 133.1 49.7 7.57% 8.75% 7.6 6.8 Jun 01
Latin America Equity
Inst. 31.3 1.0 127.5 4.6 1.41% -0.42% 4.1 7.6 Aug 07
Retail 86.1 10.3 140.3 764.1 8.07% 10.33% 8.1 6.3 Aug 00
Natural Resources Sector Equity
Inst. 37.5 2.0 117.1 45.8 7.65% 8.22% 6.8 8.5 Mar 04
Retail 107.5 14.5 167.2 162.9 7.63% 6.51% 8.9 6.6 Apr 94
Brazil Equity Retail 51.4 6.2 54.5 21.9 -0.17% 3.29% 6.5 4.9 Aug 07
India Equity
Inst. 33.7 1.0 89.1 26.0 16.92% 17.15% 1.3 2.4 Sep 08
Retail 169.7 9.4 169.3 233.7 8.36% 7.66% 7.5 5.2 Jan 07
Utilities Sector Equity
Inst. 15.0 1.6 64.8 143.5 8.51% 8.42% 8.6 9.9 May 04
Retail 32.6 8.1 644.6 308.8 7.38% 8.80% 11.3 8.1 Jan 92
Healthcare Sector Equity
Inst. 32.8 4.5 77.9 62.1 9.76% 6.76% 6.5 9.7 Mar 04
Retail 173.5 22.2 415.9 342.7 7.25% 7.11% 8.3 6.1 Jun 00
UK Equity Mid/Small Cap
Inst. 32.5 1.0 151.4 61.7 0.89% -0.62% 1.2 1.9 Feb 15
Retail 143.2 4.6 328.5 112.0 6.56% 6.65% 6.5 5.7 Jan 06
Communications Sector Equity
Inst. 4.6 4.9 9.5 8.9 7.25% 6.67% 6.0 9.5 Apr 05
Retail 39.5 13.7 148.8 73.3 5.73% 8.87% 7.9 9.1 Oct 01
Korea Equity
Inst. 83.5 5.3 33.9 29.9 6.93% 6.05% 4.5 4.4 Mar 07
Retail 280.0 41.0 96.9 57.1 13.67% 13.23% 8.9 5.7 May 01
Asia Pacific Fixed Income
Inst. 21.6 1.1 108.7 22.3 3.05% 3.75% 3.7 5.5 Sep 06
Retail 120.9 9.6 39.6 130.1 2.60% 3.34% 7.2 5.9 May 05
Thailand Equity Retail 117.5 8.8 47.0 49.0 17.88% 17.17% 10.9 9.3 Jan 01
Other Asia Equity Retail 78.6 3.5 89.8 30.7 1.46% 1.06% 5.2 6.3 Jan 08
Precious Metals Sector Equity Retail 76.8 5.9 196.1 376.0 12.31% 10.76% 9.6 6.1 Jan 92
Canadian Equity Large Cap
Inst. 4.7 2.8 34.0 216.2 5.03% 11.24% 4.9 6.5 Apr 03
Retail 159.2 13.3 368.8 379.4 8.61% 8.79% 11.1 6.6 Jan 92
55
Table A.1 (continued)
in USD Avg Number Avg TNA Avg Net Ret Avg Years First Index
Active Index Active Index Active Index Active Index Fund
Thailand Fixed Income Retail 82.8 1.0 126.6 165.0 3.60% 6.25% 7.2 10.8 Mar 06
South American Equity Retail 35.4 1.2 39.0 16.9 4.51% 4.32% 9.3 6.8 Jan 06
Other Equity
Inst. 14.6 1.8 33.3 367.9 7.26% 5.58% 5.1 6.5 Sep 09
Retail 42.5 25.3 132.9 240.9 8.27% 7.27% 8.8 6.6 Apr 96
Industrials Sector Equity
Inst. 6.0 5.7 31.7 16.8 7.59% 6.41% 6.6 9.0 Jan 06
Retail 29.2 23.9 123.6 188.6 8.96% 10.50% 8.9 7.6 Oct 01
Australia & New Zealand Eq.
Inst. 4.9 1.0 73.5 56.7 14.47% 13.70% 7.8 4.0 Dec 08
Retail 10.0 1.9 149.3 42.1 8.03% 8.92% 8.0 3.8 Feb 05
Canada Fixed Income Retail 88.9 12.9 296.2 1’064.0 4.91% 5.94% 9.5 6.5 Jan 92
Singapore Equity
Inst. 3.4 1.0 61.6 13.4 15.31% 14.31% 5.5 6.4 Apr 09
Retail 7.6 3.0 110.9 159.1 10.64% 10.25% 7.4 8.9 May 02
Canadian Eq. Mid/Small Cap Retail 81.1 2.8 179.6 111.6 5.84% 1.42% 7.5 5.4 Apr 07
Taiwan Equity
Inst. 3.0 1.0 23.6 4.3 37.40% 29.26% 1.7 2.3 Dec 08
Retail 135.2 9.9 55.9 363.3 10.42% 9.17% 11.1 7.4 Jul 03
Australia Fixed Income Retail 6.7 1.2 195.8 26.5 3.24% 3.96% 2.8 3.8 Jun 10
Malaysia Fixed Income Retail 52.9 1.0 64.5 205.8 1.81% 0.75% 6.5 9.3 Oct 07
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Table C.1: Empirical rejection probabilities: Type I errors
Empirical rejection probabilities for the nominal levels α = 10%, α = 5%, and α = 1% for the
standard (Stand), Newey–West (NW) with a bandwith of 4×(T/100)2/9, HC3, and our bootstrapped
(Boot) significance test that evaluates the optimal block size by the method of Politis and White
(2004) and the correction of Patton, Politis, and White (2009). The data was generated by sampling
from the realized returns with a circular bootstrap (Boot-x) and block sizes of x = {1, 3, 6}. The
simulation study includes ten US mutual funds that exhibit the entire return history from 1992 to
2016 in the Morningstar database. We sample 1,000 paths for each fund and DGP and set the alpha
under the null hypothesis to the true observed alpha. We show the results for the one-factor “CAPM,”
three-factor “FF3,” and five-factor “FF5” model with the factors “market,” “size,” and “value” of Fama
and French (1992), and also the “momentum” of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), and “betting against
beta” factor of Frazzini and Pedersen (2014). We highlight the p-values closest to the nominal value of
the test. Because the null hypothesis is true for all of the simulations, the true rejection probabilities
should be equal to the nominal level of the test.
Nominal CAPM FF3 FF5
DGP Level Stand NW HC3 Boot Stand NW HC3 Boot Stand NW HC3 Boot
Boot-1 α = 0.10 0.112 0.109 0.099 0.102 0.114 0.113 0.099 0.105 0.120 0.117 0.096 0.106
α = 0.05 0.061 0.059 0.049 0.053 0.062 0.060 0.050 0.056 0.064 0.061 0.046 0.053
α = 0.01 0.012 0.012 0.008 0.010 0.016 0.016 0.012 0.013 0.016 0.017 0.011 0.013
Boot-3 α = 0.10 0.142 0.119 0.125 0.111 0.137 0.123 0.120 0.106 0.135 0.118 0.111 0.105
α = 0.05 0.084 0.065 0.070 0.058 0.078 0.068 0.066 0.060 0.076 0.062 0.058 0.054
α = 0.01 0.024 0.017 0.017 0.013 0.025 0.020 0.019 0.015 0.023 0.018 0.017 0.013
Boot-6 α = 0.10 0.158 0.126 0.141 0.115 0.140 0.124 0.124 0.112 0.148 0.126 0.123 0.114
α = 0.05 0.098 0.071 0.085 0.063 0.078 0.071 0.066 0.062 0.088 0.071 0.068 0.062
α = 0.01 0.036 0.021 0.029 0.017 0.025 0.021 0.020 0.018 0.027 0.022 0.020 0.015
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Table C.2: Empirical rejection probabilities: Family wise error rates (FWER)
Empirical rejection probabilities for the nominal levels α = 10%, α = 5%, and α = 1% and the
multiple hypothesis framework of Romano and Wolf (2005a,b, 2016) controlling the FWER based
on the bootstrapped (Boot-x) significance test with block sizes of x = {1, 3, 6, 9, 12}. The DGP
is a circular bootstrap (Boot-x) with an optimal block size of x = {1, 3, 6}. The simulation study
includes the 17 retail investment categories with a history from 1993 to 2016 from Section 2 with the
investable one-factor benchmark model that is based on the value-weighted return of index funds.
For each portfolio and DGP we sample 1,000 paths and set the alpha under the null hypothesis to
the true observed alpha. We highlight the p-values closest to the nominal value of the test. Because
for all the simulations the null hypothesis is true, the true rejection probabilities should be equal to
the nominal level of the test.
DGP Nominal Level Boot-1 Boot-3 Boot-6 Boot-9 Boot-12
Boot-1 α = 0.10 0.132 0.119 0.096 0.071 0.050
α = 0.05 0.066 0.052 0.039 0.026 0.020
α = 0.01 0.015 0.009 0.006 0.004 0.002
Boot-3 α = 0.10 0.145 0.124 0.098 0.082 0.059
α = 0.05 0.081 0.062 0.048 0.040 0.030
α = 0.01 0.028 0.016 0.010 0.004 0.002
Boot-6 α = 0.10 0.132 0.114 0.087 0.066 0.046
α = 0.05 0.073 0.051 0.036 0.022 0.012
α = 0.01 0.020 0.008 0.004 0.000 0.001
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